This paper examines relationships between Presidential salaries and key performance indicators for Community Colleges in Ontario, Canada. This paper aims to determine the impact College performance has on executive salary levels. This study uses the annual Sunshine List to discern three years of data for Presidential salaries, up to and including the wage freeze in 2012, for a population of 21 colleges. Key performance indicators (KPIs) from surveys conducted by Colleges Ontario between 2010 and 2013, were used to asses lagged salary impacts. A number of linear regressions were conducted, with the dependent variable of most interest being Presidential compensation, and independent variables spanning the various KPIs, institutional size, full-time enrollment, region and the tenured years of the executive. Initially, compensation was found to negatively correlate with graduation rates, whereby compensation increases when graduation rates decrease.
INTRODUCTION
Public interest of broader public sector executive compensation in Ontario, is increasing alongside its debt. In general, public interest in the salaries of government employees surges when governments and their agencies underperform. (Bell and Van Reenen, 2016) Since Ontario is the most indebted subnational state in the world, (Eisen et. al, 2016) it follows that CEOs of Ontario para-governmental organizations, such as HydroOne, (Financial Post, 2016) Western University (CBC, 2015) and Ontario Power Generation, (Toronto Star, 2017) continue to garner significant press coverage. The annual release of the Sunshine List only further ignites this public interest, which as enacted nearly two decades ago, serves to make salaries of publically-funded positons over $100,000 known to civil society. (Ontario, 2015a) This interest has resulted in strong momentum of performance-based compensation.
In response to public skepticism, the province has taken great interest in attempting to reform their models of executive compensation with presumable intentions of balancing public accountability with the assurance of low turn-over and high expertise.
In late 2012, a wage freeze on senior executive compensation was implemented for those in the broader public sector, (Ontario, 2012) which included College Presidents, and lasted until January 2017 . Further, in September 2016 , the Wynne administration implemented a "new framework for broader public sector executive compensation [...] "which, in effect, adds requirements under the Public Sector Executive Compensation Act, 2014 , to cap payments at the 50 th percentile to appropriate competitors in the public sector. (Ontario, 2016) It is on the note of competitor appropriation that has sparked interesting proposals of executive compensation reforms. AULT | 6 With salaries being recently unfrozen, College Presidents took to the press in 2017
to argue that, since they view their role as the same to Presidents of universities, their salaries should be synchronous to these institutions. (Toronto Star, 2017) This would, if implemented, have led to increases by as much as 42%. Though eventually demoted by the Government, (CBC, 2017) it brought about an ongoing consultation process on
College top-executive rates of pay. (Ontario, 2016b) With several mentions of 'performance' in the proposed legislation of executive compensation, (Ibid) it is clear the dimension of performance-based salaries are being officially considered. Significant rhetoric of the term 'performance' appears in its new framework of executive compensation formulation, (Ontario, 2016) and thereby suggests a conceptual link between performance and compensation, and that the President would have influence over the performance of a College. However, the empirical relationships of these concepts, remains unknown for Ontario's Colleges.
Accordingly, this paper attempts to understand practical considerations in assessing the complexity, validity and prospects of performance-based pay for Ontario
College executives, by situating performance-based compensation within a framework, and an empirical analysis of the state of performance integration to wages prior to the legislation's enactment. To accomplish its aims, this paper draws on methodologies developed in existing research between non-profit performance and executive compensation in Ontario to discern the relationship between key performance indicators (KPIs) and Presidential compensation for Ontario's publically-funded Colleges. In specific, this paper addresses three preeminent questions within such frame (1) Are
Presidential salaries reflective Institutional KPIs of Ontario's Colleges? (2) Are KPIs AULT | 7 impacted by the salary of the College President? and (3) Does Presidential compensation mediate between KPI variance in Colleges?
Existing literature on performance-based compensation has been mainly directed to the private sector, though a growing number of studies also concern themselves with para-governmental organizations. Most evidence suggests weak relationships between efforts of the President and firm performance, thus implies challenges in design for performance-based compensation. (Carpenter and Sanders, 2002; Rago, 1996) Conversely, there are also many studies advancing that the President greatly impacts firm performance, which conclude suggesting the success of performance-based systems depends on their implementation. (Noe, 2006; Ballou, 2001; O'Donnell, 1998; Reilly, 2003; Rappaport, 1998) The most recent study specifically concerning performance and compensation of Ontario College executives, was in the year of 2000, (Alexander, 2000) Given Alexander's paper on performance measures in Colleges, this paper employs his classification to discern variables of College performance. Altogether, this research contributes to scholarship for it provides insight to an emerging concept of executive compensation within Canadian public administration, and could be used in future comparative analysis of the impacts of the newly instituted policy and could further refine the direction of optimal compensation for College Presidents.
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FRAMEWORK
Studies on College Presidential compensation have generally been conducted at the private-sector firm level, generally linking higher salaries to strength in business strategies, (Gordon and Fisher, 2014; Abor, 2015) and was identified as a primary indicator to firm innovation. (cite need). The concept of performance-based pay a key pillar to public human resource management reforms (PHRMR), which is herein argued to be situated at the intersection of scientific management and New Public Management (NPM). Underlying its philosophy, a desire to balance accountability, achieve effectiveness, and minimize turn-over thus is focussed on applying a market oriented approach to achieve efficiency. Studies of scientific management also highlight the importance of the President in organizations. They discern the POLC framework, which creates firm leaders, like College Presidents, having a role in planning, organizing, leading and controlling the measures of a firm and thereby have influence on outputs.
Theoretical Underpinnings

Agency Theory
In 1776, famous economist Adam Smith noted that when firms are controlled by others than their owners, the goals of the firm will fall, (Smith, 1776; Laffont and Martimort, 2009 ) and thereby he provides a foundation for what would become the principal-agent model of Agency Theory. This concept refers to agents (management) enabled to make decisions for principals (owners), and assumes each actor would act in self-interest, and with information asymmetry, not get noticed for so doing thereby comprising a moral hazard. (Frederickson, 2015) In political studies, this has been applied on voters being the principal, and a politician assuming agency. Likewise, in public administration, it AULT | 10 generally takes the shape of the politician as the principal and the bureaucrat as the agent. (Miller, 2005) 
Scientific Management
In general, performance-based pay can be situated within the broader framework of scientific management, a discipline founded on applications of effectivenessmaximizing measures. (Frederickson, 2015; Taylor, 2004) Research has already found a strong role of scientific management in the ideation and implementation of incentive bonuses, based on performance at the firm level. (Armstrong, 2010) This also holds true in the case of performance-based executive compensation, as base pay would be in place with predetermined incentives paid in relation to the outcomes of their duties. The surrounding idea to this end would therefore be a desire to exceed targets, however these targets would have to be tangible and aligned to the years of which they contribute. If efforts from the President are not realized until the year following, or even the one following that, it may be more challenging to attribute ideas and their implementation towards the years they impact. However, there can be many measurable and generally effective methods for mitigating for this, such as running experiments to account for multiyear effects of specific policies independent of other factors shown to have linkages.
Compensation, therefore, would be made on a more consistent model for implementing existing ideas. However, when new initiatives are beginning, it may be unreasonable for AULT | 12 payments to be made for initiatives bearing impact. This lends itself to limitations of performance based compensation, whereby long-term improvement initiatives may be less hyped by executives because their compensation would not provide for multi-year compensation, and that these hyped ideas would occur earlier in their tenure. However, reputations would still provide incentive to carry these indicatives forward, as Jonathan
Haidt (2012) claims such concept drives human behaviour. Though this would not be impacted by performance-based compensation and be treated as equal to today's environment.
New Public Management
NPM is the pinnacle concept for characterizing worldwide reforms in policy towards concepts of the private sector. Frederickson (2015) outlines three main reforms of NPM, being a further emphasis on results-orientation, marketization and accountability in public administration. For the public executive, performance-based pay could be their impact from NPM. (Gagnon, 2016) First, by design, it is mostly focussed on results as the President would theoretically be pressured to increase their College's performance to increase their paycheque. Second, by aligning interests of the College with the President, the Government is hence using the market to rationally motivate the President to produce more results because their pay cheque could be enhanced. It is noted that this basis in particular, however, is limited for assuming all actors as rational. Lastly, NPM moves towards accountability, for which, public scrutiny of a performance-based executive would have greater trust in their public servants working for the greater good, as opposed to their individual interests. In fact, salary disclosures are generally rooted in "accountability" measures of NPM. (Bowman, 2013) Performance-based pay is could be a rendition of AULT | 13 NPM in regards to compensation drawing into it, perspectives of agency and scientific management theories, all encapsulated in public human resources management reform.
Ontario has been long publicized for its integration of NPM reforms, ever since the days of its Premier Mike Harris and his "common sense revolution." (Clark, 2015) This imitative has since been generalized to be a collection of NPM-oriented legislation. This resulted in the size of government being shrunk to a manageable level, school funding equalized across the province, and many responsibilities transferred to Municipalities. A common theme to this movement was to be more business-like with efficiency maximized.(Ibid) Performance-based pay fits this paradigm, as it aims to reduce costs of executive compensation. Further, it fits into the frame of scientific management, as it is theoretically most advantages one to maximize the potential of their organization when salaries are reflected on so doing.
To date, there has only been one study to concern itself with performance-based compensation in the Canadian context. Atkinson et. al in 2014, through interviews, examined why the Canadian government was implementing performance-based compensation to senior public servants. From their research, they characterize three waves of reasons for governments doing so, namely 'aggressive,' 'passive,' and 'reluctant.' They conclude noting "no [doubt of] the enthusiasm" for performance-based compensation regimes in other areas of government, and suggest there to be much more evidence until it becomes more wide-spread. Moreover, they also link it to New public management in attempts to commit to strengthen executive control, a part of Aucoin's (2008) definition of NPM.
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Conceptual Framework
Performance-Based Compensation
Academia is split on its support for performance-based compensation. On one hand, it is argued to increase the motivation of the President to contribute to the organization, given their salaries would be determined by the success of their efforts. (Noe, 2006; Ballou, 2001; O'Donnell, 1998; Reilly, 2003; Rappaport, 1998) In addition, employee engagement has been identified (Noe, 2006) as a factor dictating success of Performance-based programs, and this is generally positive in Canada. (Hickey and Bennett, 2014) However, others argue that, while this is be true, such mechanism of compensation also has "hidden costs" from giving too much for performance, that otherwise would have been accomplished. (Weibel et. al, 2010) This criticism, however,
should not discount the idea entirely, as well-designed and implemented performance for-profit organizations in Canada found boards in both sectors having equal influence to the implementation of strategies. (Bradshaw et. al, 1992) Thus, regarding the role of the Board to determine executive performance would be important. Ben-Ner and Ren (2011) concluded performance-based compensation regimes would result in an increase to the willingness of the executive to exceed the Board's expectation.
By examining the relationships of KPIs in Ontario Colleges to their Presidential compensation, from both impact models, this paper hopes to shed light on the complexity on the implementation of performance based compensation in Ontario's Colleges.
Further, based on its findings, it hopes to conclude on providing a rational way to do so, or not to do so, given that this is a contented area of public administration.
Defining Performance in the Context of Publically-Funded Colleges in Ontario
When pondering 'performance,' there are a several concepts to consider when applying the frameworks of executive compensation to non-profit organizations, and specifically to Colleges? First, as non-profits, the basis for evaluation should be the criteria of their mandates and not the financial performance of the entity. (Akingbola, 2012; Druker, 2004) In the context of Hospitals, this translated to patient satisfaction.
(Akingbola and van den Berg, 2015) Likewise, for most Colleges, this means being assessed on grounds of outputs to graduate success.
Outcomes of graduates are central to the mission of any educational institution, including Colleges, as they form the purpose of the Institute. Furthermore, achieving these outcomes in terms of graduate, employment and satisfaction rates need to be a AULT | 16 top-priority of Ontario's Colleges. However, there are still barriers of access that exist in addition to a need for those to stay in programs. This general operationalization is consistent with other research examining outcomes of career-oriented Colleges. (Fike and Fike, 2008; Alexander, 2000) One study operationalizing graduate success to conceptualize 'student success,'
has been one conducted on American community Colleges, which given their careerfocussed short-term study offerings, compare to Canadian Colleges quite well. Dowd Further, Dowd factors in a range of "peer selection criteria," including budgets, service area populations, unemployment rates, median incomes and minority representation.
These factors are noted by Colleges Ontario to potentially distort cross-institutional studies on reflectiveness. (Colleges Ontario, 2010 , 2011 , 2012 Lastly, things related to enrollment, design, and efficiency are categorized as inputs. Under this labelling, it could be discerned as to how evaluation of colleges could be done for 'performance,' when accounting for specified controls.
Ontario's Legislation
The term 'performance' appears rather frequently in the Broader Public Sector
Executive Compensation Act, 2014, however was not explicitly defined in that document.
In its accompanying "Framework Guide," (Ontario, 2016) performance-based compensation is defined as being "any payments provided to reward the attainment of AULT | 17 pre-determined performance goals and may include incentive pay, merit pay, variable pay, etc." (Ibid) Based on this guide, several Ontario Colleges are now seeking public consultation to its specific formula for the compensation of their lead executive. Though, the term itself was not operationalized for the Colleges sector in such guide, and given that the performance of colleges should be assessed on non-financial indicators of its mandate, the metrics of each College's mandate could be synchronous to 'performance.'
Each college has a strategic mandate from the Province of Ontario to fulfil, and separate system-wide variables along five key themes. These include (i) key areas of differentiation, (ii) alignment with differentiation in policy (iii) aspirations (iv) enrollment and (v) financial sustainability. When reviewing each of the themes for non-financial system-wide and graduate-centered variables in strategic mandates of each of the Colleges, several indicators were discerned. These metrics are rates of (a) graduate employment (b) employer satisfaction (c) graduate employment in a related job, (d) graduation, (e) student satisfaction, (f) retention, (g) co-op participation, (h) proportions of International, Aboriginal, francophone, first generation and disabled students (i) number of college graduates in university programs and (j) proportions of enrollment in occupational clusters and credentials. Given the wide-range of criteria, it is also important to note institutional strengths would depend on the strength of emphasis placed on each.
Each college generally leads provincially and a number of niche areas, and also responds to regional demands. Colleges in Northern regions, for example, are situated in greatly different employment contexts than those in the South with average earnings being much less than elsewhere. Northern communities have careers in different sectors than their Southern counterparts such as natural resources, faces lower levels of AULT | 18 educational attainment compared to other areas leading to an increase in first-generation students, and most of all, has a significantly higher number of Indigenous students it would need to equip with education. (Bennett and Anuik, 2014) Ontario to a private firm, which surveys roughly 6% of the graduates, students and employers for each college. This study specifically used five measures of this survey, recording values of graduate employment and graduation directly; and the "Very Satisfied/ Satisfied" variable for each of the three satisfaction rates. The options for each satisfaction rate were either "Very Satisfied/ Satisfied", "Neither Satisfied/ Nor Dissatisfied" and "Very Dissatisfied/ Dissatisfied."
In addition, other resources were used to examine the commencement of a President's term, discerned from searching the news in the Factiva database along the search criteria "[President name] AND [College Name]" to which, the year was recorded.
Full-time equivalent (FTE) statistics were also found using publications for Colleges Ontario, whereby it revealed 'Funded FTE students' as a measure to calculate all full time plus pro-rated part-time students with funding. (Colleges Ontario, 2010) While not representative of the entire school population, it was assumed that the percentage of funded students to non-funded would be the same for all Colleges, and was used because AULT | 20 it was the only available, consistent and yearly figure available to incorporate both fulland part-time students, given the differences of this composition between Colleges. It is estimated this would indicate the class sizes and student leadership opportunities. The number of employees of a school was used as a proxy for size of institution, and operationalized as the number of employees an institution had on the Sunshine List in 2010. This data was then converted to three levels to reflect different sizes of Colleges:
(1) <50 employees on the List, (2) 50-99 employees on the List and (2) Graduation Rate was shown to be impacted, two models then followed, with such as the dependent variable and Presidential Compensation, adjusted for inflation, as an independent variable. To see variance in predictive strength and variable indications, a model then proceeded to exclude adjusted compensation from the model altogether. AULT | 22 Both models were repeated using the step-wise method. Collectively, these models provide for an overview of impacts of compensation on graduation rates with controls.
The fifth model was to determine main effects of compensation on KPIs of that period, and the one previous. The hypothesis was that the President would be compensated for the performance of the year previous, instead of the one current.
Accordingly, Presidential Compensation legged by one year, was the dependent variable, and the independent and control variables remain the same from the previous models.
A Preacher and Hayes' Indirect Mediation test was later conducted to examine if,
based on the results, the compensation of the College President was a mediator between the variables predicting graduation rates, and graduation rates. This test was conducted, by installing and running a regression using the plugin macro, as found on their website which builds from Sobel's method of approximating standard errors. In effect, this method resembles that of "bootstrapping" which tests indirect effects by resampling and replacing many times, from which, the indirect effect is later computed and distributed. (Ibid)
Though not discerning the actual indirect effect, it is helpful for identifying significance of these relationships. Preacher and Hayes are the scholars who have written the code for SPSS, for which their model was installed and ran in this study that previous models AULT | 23 suggested Presidential Salaries to have correlate to in alongside other variables when Presidential salaries were excluded.
Descriptive Statistics
This The natural logarithm of annual Presidential compensation tested as being most close to a normal distribution of such. Other studies (Akingbola and van den Berg, 2015; Ferri and Maher, 2013; Perry, 2001 ) also use a natural logarithm for executive AULT | 24 compensations. The natural logarithm of the number of full time students was also determined to be the most normal distribution of such. All KPIs were also computed to their natural logarithms for the generation of most normal distributions. All KPIs were correlated against each other in each of the years to determine if a composite variable would be appropriate. However, there was no uniformity among the indicators, and thus did not employ a variable to that end. These KPIs were individually correlated against Adjusted compensation without accounting for controls, and only graduation and employment rates were significant, at .000 and .025 respectively. It is noted that the standard deviation of all KPIs between the years were relatively low, with employer and graduate satisfaction in the 2% range, graduate employment and student satisfaction in the 3% range and graduation levels in the 4% range, at 4.58%.
Each President had the change in salary calculated, excluding part-years to not skew results. As shown in This Model claims to account for 45.3% of the variance in compensation, and that the main drivers of compensation are enrollment and graduation rates, with the adjusted coefficient of enrollment being similar to that in the present year, as represented in Model I, (.602, .606) and both being very significant (.000.) Further, like Models I and II, the graduation rate is presented to have a negative relationship with executive compensation.
RESULTS
Are Presidential salaries reflective Institutional KPIs of Ontario's Colleges?
Difference between Models III and IV is just under 4% (.492 -.453) with the additional independently significant variable of being in Eastern Ontario, and collectively with variables of other controls and KPIs. In addition, changes both in real and nominal terms were correlated against their tenure, region, student enrollment and size of their college changes along with KPIs, though yielded no significant independent variable nor regression model. This shows that wage increases and decreases are not made by any formula with any identified variable in this study and thus are not made on the basis of performance. Nonetheless, these models collectively suggest legged Presidential compensation impacts enrollment and, to a less extent, graduation rates.
AULT | 29 The location within the province lead for variation in all KPIs except for graduate satisfaction, with Eastern Ontario colleges yielding more graduate employment, those in Southwestern Ontario yielding higher rates of graduation and student satisfaction from its institutions, Eastern Ontario colleges having higher rates of student satisfaction and the five colleges in the North of the province having less employer satisfaction. Lastly, the size of institution impacting graduate satisfaction, with graduates of large institutions being most satisfied, and those from medium sized institutions being least. As observed, adjusted CEO compensation remains to only be a factor in graduation rates, where the standardized coefficient is quite high at -4.060. This is investigated further in Models X through XIII in table 4, below. All other variables were insignificant. (p>0.05)
Are KPIs impacted by the salary of the College President?
AULT | 31 Model X through XIII show the results of various models involving the natural logarithms of graduation rates, on the natural logarithm for adjusted Presidential compensation, in constant 2010 dollars, and several controls. From the stepwise regression in Models V through IX, it was found that there was no significance between such rates and those of the size of institution. Accordingly, these controls were excluded from these Models.
AULT | 32
Model X shows the results of a linear regression, finding only two significant variables accounting for approximately one-sixth variation in graduation rates, at 17.7%.
The stepwise regression of this, being Model XI only accounts for 1.1% less, with significant variables being graduate employment and the compensation of the President.
With the latter being of interest, a linear regression was then run to exclude the compensation variable to determine what else correlates to such KPI that may be related to the Presidential compensation.
Model XII shows these results, accounting for significantly less variance at only 9.9%
with notably less significance, at 0.013. However, it is still below the 0.05 benchmark of significance. While no variables were found to be independently significant under this model, the stepwise regression model shows significance of graduate employment and the number of FTE students of the institution. While graduate employment rates were also found to be a factor in models inclusive of Presidential compensation, a negative relationship with the number of FTE enrollment was found to be new with the exclusion of such variable. The stepwise regression also accounts for slightly more variance at 10.0% and is more significant than the former. This is, overall, less than models X and XI, though yields a standardized coefficient of roughly one-third that of Presedential compensation. Thus, it raises a question, given Presidential compensation relies is positively related to the number of FTE students, as discerned from (1) significance between Presidential compensation and graduation rate, independent of FTE student population, as path c' had significance far beyond that required to have statistical significance (.6644). These tests were conducted from the macro on the author's website, installed and run in SPSS as a macro. Thus, while there does appear to be a negative link between graduation rate and FTE student population, this is not to suggest that smaller Colleges yield better graduation rates per-se, as a study breaking down specific sizes of Colleges would have to be regressed on such rate to discern the optimal size of the College for these KPIs to be achieved; though not this paper's focus. Central to the mandate of Colleges are their commitments to graduate students, leading them to good jobs in their field and satisfying their students, graduates and community employers. Several studies have suggested non-profit entities not having financial indicators being relevant of its performance. (Akingbola, 2013; Mook, 2007) Instead, it is argued that effectiveness is best measured on how they achieve their mission statements, and drive value creation. Thus, college Presidents ought to be measured for their performance, on their ability to impact the proportion of their students graduate, are lead to good jobs and satisfy employers, with satisfaction at each level. While College executive salaries have risen between 2010 and 2013 nominally and a little bit in real terms, unfortunately, performance indicators have not. AULT | 35 The findings of this research indicate Presidential salaries of Ontario Colleges yield no reflection or legged reflection of nor impact on any key performance indicator. This is consistent with research which examined similar measures to hospital CEOs. (Akingbola and van den Berg, 2015) Together, these results suggest the role of Presidents are more far removed from the activities of the organization to have any meaningful impact, as suggested by previous scholarship. (Carpenter and Sanders, 2002; Rago, 1996) Thus, this calls into question how Presidents could impact the performance, for performancebased compensation.
This study reviewed, in detail, a seemingly negative relationship between Presidential compensation and the graduation rates, however discerned this to be based on changes to the enrolled students of an institute. These observations were made from several regression models, including many step-wise models, and a test of mediation. However, before Ontario does this, they should also account for current institutional contexts, including their size, number of full time equivalent students and the region in which they are situated. While the first may seem obvious, the latter is specifically unique to Canada.
Indigenous peoples, for example, are strongly important to the further development of the Province's northern region (Cuddy and Moazzami, 2016a , 2016b , 2016c mandates for institutions are in order, as they exist today, for those to specialize in recruitment of specific types of students along with program specializations. This study did not review the impact of these, nor changes to these, in relation to Presidential compensation. This was because of the lack in reporting consistency of the Colleges, who are to post online records for the Ministry's accountability purposes, and highlights these variables in addition to retention rates. However, not all colleges keep previous editions posted and thus lead to a discrepancy. Future research may want to account for these and changes in such levels, in relation to executive compensation, by filing Freedom of Information requests. Also, local conditions were not included in this study, which may need to be enhanced to situate a college's impact in their communities.
There are several implications of this research for which future studies may build.
First, as the factors to changes in compensation are unknown within this study during this period, research may want to explore factors effecting such variance with interviews of University Board Directors. Second, as student enrollment was the most significant variable impacting both, Presidential compensation and several KPIs, future research should factor in compositions of the student body, in terms of Indigenous, disabled and first-generation status in light of these differences to asses for changes, by using the "report back" accountability reports provided by each college to the Ministry. As discussed, future research would have to obtain these reports through freedom of information requests for some years at some Colleges. Most importantly, this research provides a solid grounding for comparative analysis to occur to asses impacts of the now- AULT | 38 enacted legislation and the near-future changes it may see. While delivering several benefits to academia, it also has implications for those consulted on CEO compensation.
Practical Implications
To "Control, Compare and Compensate" is the model of the recommendation herein proposed for Ontario to adopt. Overall, this model will entail that all College Presidents would, in part, be paid for their contributions to improvements to the outputs they aim to achieve within their community's context. As opposed to comparing a set number of Colleges, this model will account for all the controls as proposed by including the market, demographic and institutional context a College is located within to a specified measure. Second, based on category scores, Colleges, per ranking value, would be compared against a like set, which in turn would factor improvements made by the President year-to-year. As this would be reflected in a principal-agent model, the responsibility for an Institution's improvement rests on the President. Compensation would thereby entail to this regard, and based solely on objective outputs more than financial, for the latter is only a throughput and not output of community Colleges in Ontario. Regional considerations are also to be factored into the comparison. For measures of ultimate success, and rank, it is proposed that Colleges should be ranked on the percentage of students that continue to Universities, given the inflation of job qualifications of the modern economy.
CONCLUSION
This research paper sought to examine the current relationship between institutional performance and executive compensation in Ontario's publically-funded Colleges. First, a framework was discerned for the nature of performance related pay, its AULT | 39 momentum in public discourse, the importance of developing and implementing strong formulas, and the challenges that face it within the context of educational institutions.
Second, this study provides evidence that performance has not dictated institutional, presidential compensation before enactment of frozen wages and performance-based legislation. To this end, it shows that salaries are not made on an institution's performance but rather their enrollment figures, that changes to salaries are not greatly made on regional, size nor KPI differences, and that KPIs themselves are not impacted significantly by the compensation of the President.
There are several limitations to this study. First, this study is limited to publically- Altogether, this research suggests Presidential compensation is not significantly linked with key performance indicators of the institutions to which they preside, before the enactment of legislation. Instead, it is deemed that such is more strongly based on their AULT | 40 tenure, the location and size of their institution, in addition to presumably financially-based measures. It is possible that true performance-related pay is made for community Colleges, however such would have to account for like organizations. While a model is proposed herein, it should be taken with a need for further research to determine the specific financial variables that are accounted for, and moreover, alternative means at achieving and improving KPIs that could be started and directed by the President. Further, it is suggested that this analysis also be conducted for other publically-funded institutions in Ontario.
